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Critical Rhetorics of Controversy 
Kent A. Ono and John M. Sloop 
We appreciate the opportunity to respond to the many issues raised in Kendall Phillips's 
(1999a) essay "A Rhetoric of Controversy" and Thomas Goodnight's (1999) essay/response 
Mssrs. Dinkins, Rangel and Savage in Colloquy on the African Burial Ground: A 
Companion Reading." Our interest in "controversy" and "the political," among other 
issues they raise, leads us to respond to their arguments, to draw some connections to our 
own work where relevant, and, hopefully, to expand the terms of the conversation 
between Phillips and Goodnight in order to encourage other scholars interested in these 
subjects to participate in the discussion. 
OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, we have been engaged in discussions regarding critical rhetoric and, indirectly, issues of the public 
sphere. We welcome the chance to comment specifically on issues 
affecting "the political" more directly here. 1 For this colloquy, we re-
spond to the two new essays by Kendall Phillips and G. Thomas 
Goodnight as well as other relevant research. We cannot help but read 
Phillips's (1999a) essay in the context of another recent essay (1999b) of 
his that appeared in Philosophy and Rhetoric [hereafter P&R], and 
that responded to an earlier P&R essay (1997) we wrote ("Out-law 
Discourse: The Critical Politics of Material Judgment"). Because our 
original piece in P&R is a detailed examination of the political theories 
of both Jean Fran~ois Lyotard and Chantal Moufi'e,2 who also are the 
subjects of two of Goodnight's essays (1995, 1999), we respond to 
Goodnight's earlier essays as well. 
We begin by noting a few points of common interest in the two new 
essays. Both Phillips and Goodnight express distinct interest in issues 
of the public sphere, though from statedly different positions. Both see 
a discussion of controversy as beneficial and both encourage more 
conversation about the study and theorization of controversy. Both 
regard the case ofthe New York City African Burial Ground as worthy 
of examination and ultimately of praise. Both seek to expand the 
rhetorical resources available for rhetors. Both concern themselves 
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with issues of marginality and the public sphere. While the commonali-
ties do not end there, we only mention these few in order to suggest that 
despite the contestive nature of much of the language in these essays, 
there is much in common to both. 
Phillips 
In response to several essays by Goodnight, some of them co-
authored, Phillips (1999a) examines the rhetoric surrounding an Afri-
can burial ground in New York City in order to build on Goodnight's 
(1991) call for more research on controversy. Phillips's essay logically 
follows his earlier essay (1996) on dissension, which challenges what he 
sees as a predisposition toward seeking the telos of consensus assumed 
within public sphere research. In his most recent essay (1999a), Phil-
lips is interested in "the emergence of oppositional arguments that 
render the frameworks for deliberation problematic" (p. 489), and he 
wants to expand the spheres of argumentation through "reflection on 
discursive conventions and habits, and draws more and more communi-
cative practices and regularities into a traditional arena of public 
deliberation (p. 489). Focusing primarily on Goodnight's research, 
Phillips (1999a) contends that public sphere discourse tends to flatten 
time and space in favor of dominant institutional forces, thereby closing 
down and containing the potential disruptiveness of resistant dis-
courses. Phillips chooses a strategy for reading discourses that empha-
sizes the disruption and disorientation caused by social actors who 
tactically seize the moment and create the potential for a change of 
public assumptions about, among other things, history. According to 
Phillips, such disrupting and disorienting acts may lead to a more 
profound displacement of regularized institutional patterns and dis-
courses and their (at least temporary) replacement with new ones. 
The case of the African Burial Ground is an intriguing one. The 
Federal General Services Administration (GSA) began a construction 
project in 1991 near City Hall Park in New York City. Upon finding the 
bones of African slaves dating back to 1690, construction halted, then 
resumed until public criticism and political maneuverings led a U.S. 
House of Representatives subcommittee overseeing the GSA to inter-
vene and hold a fact-gathering meeting. What was initially treated as a 
fait accompli by the GSA, which continued to articulate its authorial 
logic over the situation to the very end, suddenly was disrupted when 
protesters and African American luminaries successfully intervened, 
appealed to a higher authority, and ultimately displaced the GSA's 
power over the site and replaced it with a politically emergent one. 
While we are sympathetic to Phillips's overall attempt to bring 
"controversy" to the forefront as a potentially fruitful site for examina-
tion, and while we ourselves embrace much that we might label 
"poststructural" within his theorizing (e.g., disrupting authoritative 
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logics and institutions and embracing the provisional nature of associa-
tions, subject positions, and power), we would like to raise four brief 
concerns about his essay. 
First, many critical challenges to public sphere research have al-
ready been made (e.g., see the list of critical works Goodnight and 
Hingstman discuss in their 1997 review). By rehashing this critique 
and positioning the rhetoric of controversy in response to public sphere 
research, versus, say, in response to "critical rhetoric" research, Phillips 
needlessly recenters a quite possibly now-defunct version of public 
sphere research within the field, a version from which Goodnight 
overtly distances himself. 
Second, it is unclear to us how the outcome of the controversy over 
the African Burial Ground is a politically desirable one. Phillips implies 
that the ultimate conclusion of the ordeal, the creation of a memorial at 
the site, is liberatory when in fact, while it problematizes a certain 
positioning of authority, it repositions another one that rearticulates 
governmental authority over land disputes. As Phillips characterizes 
it, "On July 30th the General Services Administration permanently 
halted digging at the cemetery site. Early in 1993 the African Burial 
Ground was made an official historical landmark" (pp. 503-504). We 
imagine many critical scholars might read this as saying, "See, the 
system works just fine." However, are "official" historical landmarks-
which in many ways signify the power of the state, ifnot the dominance 
of state power generally-forms of radical resistance for African Ameri-
cans, for African Americans in New York, and for other communities 
whose histories have been ignored and/or marginalized? 
Third, we pause over Phillips's conceptualization of the role of 
academic criticism. In assessing our (1997) approach to criticism in the 
outlaw discourse essay, Phillips (1999b) writes that "Rather than 
academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, 
everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criti-
cism" (p. 97). Herein, Phillips both suggests academic criticism plays no 
role in the realm of politics and seems to indicate that the only way any 
of us speaks or writes is through academic criticism. We suggest that 
everyday acts of resistance-most notably those that are incommensu-
rable with dominant logics-inform and should be part of one's own 
politics. That is, we are not suggesting that one looks for outlaw 
discourses or controversies solely in order to write "academic criticism" 
about them; we are suggesting (and this is certainly not new) both that 
one views one's "academic criticism" as political and that one see one's 
task as moving outside of some limited understanding of what "aca-
demic criticism" can do. What occurs in Phillips's essay is a conflation of 
"controversy" and "incommensurability." In our "Out-law" essay, we are 
attempting to encourage critics to look for cases of "the differend" or 
"incommensurability" (which requires that one take into account vari-
ous logics and their power relations), rather than cases of disagree-
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ment (which are seen as differences of opinion, not differences in the 
relative power of logics and positions), in order to provide a radical 
rethinking of the possibilities for any given discourse. 
A controversy that is part of a commensurable discourse is one in 
which two or more positions disagree on the outcome of a shared 
question (e.g., How should this burial ground be treated?). In cases of 
commensurable controversies, shared logics and institutions are used 
to reach a conclusion (through, for example, public sphere discussions 
or the court system) and to enact that solution (e.g., via the Park 
Service or the Smithsonian). In incommensurable controversies, the 
legitimacy of the logics and institutions employed are at base being 
undermined. Hence, an outlaw discourse might not recognize even the 
right of the city/state of New York to have a position on the grounds. An 
outlaw logic might not recognize the rightllegitimacy of a US govern-
ment institution to care for land that contains bodies which the outlaw 
logic situates as transcending the legitimacy of the very system that 
allowed for the unseemly deaths and burials. An outlaw critique looks 
for logics that could potentially undermine dominant logics rather than 
for controversies that illustrate how well it works. In short, while 
Phillips seeks a logic other than the one the GSA asserts (a bureau-
cratic, linear, one-solution-to-every-problem-like-this-one logic), he ulti-
mately praises a logic that counters the GSA's logic on the GSA's own 
grounds; he does not look outside existing dominant logics. 
Goodnight 
Goodnight's (1999) response to Phillips centers on his perception 
that Phillips is engaged in a project of anti-essentialism. Aligning 
himself primarily with Mouffe (1996) Goodnight rejects both essential-
ism and anti-essentialism, viewing both as insufficient grounds for 
mobilizing toward the political. Like Mouffe, Goodnight suggests rheto-
ric that performs a ''we" is necessary to the political; thus, a rhetoric 
based on difference that cannot distinguish between positions is insuffi-
cient to recover provisional affiliations. Goodnight argues that Phillips's 
approach distances the critic from the controversy; uses "negative" 
terminology, which he says provides no opening for study of the text to 
inform theory; and sees appeals not thought to be properly oppositional 
as creating dissension. 
Goodnight reexamines the case of the African Burial Ground by 
looking specifically at the opening addresses given by Dinkins, Rangel, 
and Savage, all of which appeared in a government document publica-
tion. Goodnight's rereading of the meeting calls attention to nuances 
missed in Phillips's analysis of Dinkins's address, such as Dinkins's 
extension and expansion of the dialogue. Goodnight reads Dinkins's 
discourse as expanding the GSA's own limited sense of its role as well. 
Goodnight comments on Rangel's comments, which Phillips does not 
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discuss, and compares what he thinks a critic like Phillips might have 
said about Rangel's address to Goodnight's own approach, an approach 
that appreciates artful language, imaginative inventional aspects, and 
the potential to generate further conversation and expand rhetorical 
resources. Goodnight also rereads Savage, emphasizing Savage's prag-
matic approach to utilizing decorum to establish a context within which 
to discuss a matter of importance. Goodnight ultimately argues for an 
appreciation of the aesthetic dimensions of the text, especially its "art" 
and "beauty" as a possible way to create potential public affiliations. 
The central significance of Goodnight's recent work is his call for 
renewed political engagement on public issues of importance. Whether 
discussing the controversial (Goodnight 1991, 1995; Olson & Good-
night, 1994) or "the public sphere" (Goodnight & Hingstman, 1997), 
Goodnight stresses the need for political engagement. Aligning himself 
with recent work by Jurgen Habermas3 and Chantal Mouffe, Goodnight 
concerns himself with the increasing privatization of the economic and 
the political; with public apathy resulting from increasingly aggressive 
corporate public relations discourse; with postmodern skepticism and 
complacency accelerated by ever-more-efficient (and viscerally pleasur-
able) advertising practices; as well as with an overall skeptical outlook 
taken by many in the academy. In his recent review essay with Hingst-
man (1997), Goodnight also carefully addresses issues of race, gender, 
and sexuality as they impact contemporary public sphere research. 
Goodnight's call for renewed political activism and communication 
about the political is certainly welcome. Indeed, we appreciate the fact 
that he continues to call attention to the risks of skepticism and 
complacency within the academy and in society generally, a point 
similar to one we, ourselves, have mentioned as well (1992). Neverthe-
less, while we are allied with Goodnight on this point, there are aspects 
of Goodnight's work that concern us. 
First, despite citing and reviewing texts critical of public sphere 
research, Goodnight does not sufficiently clarify the ways his own 
theoretical project has changed as a result of influences by feminist, 
poststructuralist, and ethnic studies scholarship. By not foregrounding 
these changes, Goodnight makes a circuitous pattern around these 
perspectives, while nevertheless being influenced by them; hence, he 
misses an opportunity to bring marginalized discourses and theories to 
the fore. We suggest that a different tactic would be to highlight the 
ways that poststructural, feminist, ethnic studies, and cultural studies 
scholarship has challenged public sphere scholarship (e.g., see Black 
Public Sphere Collective, 1995; Fraser 1989, 1992; Zulick & Laffoon, 
1991) and to note the ways that historical public sphere scholarship, in 
general, may have the effect offurther marginalizing already-marginal-
ized research. 
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Second, Goodnight's notion that we are currently in a period of 
protracted skepticism needs to be historically grounded. Indeed, even if 
our present era is marked by increasing skepticism and apathy, is it not 
possible, like the "lull before the storm," to read historical periods as 
contingent? Hence periods of unrest would be followed by reflection and 
ultimately change? Further, Goodnight does not explain how critical 
skepticism is related to political apathy. On the face of things, those 
who are rigorously, indeed relentlessly, critical of contemporary society 
and culture strive to build community through their criticism. Thus, in 
one reading, it is precisely those who are most critical-who are willing 
to take the risks, to cross the boundaries, to speak the unspeakable-
who give people the courage to participate in the political. 
Third, Goodnight reads Mouffe (1996) as providing evidence that too 
much skepticism leads to an evacuation of the political. However, he 
does not note that she frames her essay not as a critique of post modern-
ism, but, in fact, as a response to essentialist humanism, universal 
reason, and individualism-what many would think of as the basic 
tenets of traditional public sphere scholarship.4 While selective use of 
the work of a theorist is not necessarily problematic, in this case 
Goodnight's use ofMouffe allows him to critique the work of Phillips for 
its negative standpoint without forcing himself and all of us to problema-
tize our own work. Instead, Goodnight rereads some of his previous 
work as ifit already implies Mouffe's argument. In our minds, it would 
be more beneficial to place past public sphere scholarship in critical 
conversation with various assumptions made in the present, thereby 
forcing us to rethink those positions rather than simply allowing 
previous work to slip seamlessly into one's current assumptions. 
Fourth, in his 1995 essay, in calling for a renewed interest in issues 
of political import, Goodnight unfortunately conflates critical "postmod-
ern" thinkers in the academy with corporate, economic "postmodern" 
culture, both of which he suggests are part of the same political apathy 
resulting in the decline of public sphere activity. In referencing Lyo-
tard, Goodnight ultimately conflates Lyotard, the scholar, with the 
subject of Lyotard's discourse, the "postmodern condition," and posits 
Lyotard's discourse more as symptom of postmodern culture than as 
strategy in response to it. 
Fifth, Goodnight's 1995 article constructs oppositions that are unnec-
essary to his argument. Whereas the public sphere is the location of 
prudent, "rational" decision-making, contains political import and dem-
onstrates real "commitment to the public realm" (p. 269), postmodern-
ism is "divisive," "alienating," "cynical," "mean-spirited," and "off-
putting"; it is "suspicious" and "cynical" (p. 272); it shows "anger" and 
"resentment" and can often be found "ballyhooing difference" (p. 272). 
Whereas modernists prefer "public involvement," postmodernists pre-
fer "the security of private life" (p. 272). Whereas modernism has a 
"public sphere," postmodernism is "highly fragmented" and tends to-
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ward schizophrenia (p. 272). Whereas modern rhetoric is "nostalgic," 
postmodernist rhetoric is "skeptical" (p. 271). Whereas b;aditional 
rhetoric engages in agon-good spirited competition, and alea-
sensible risk-taking, postmodern rhetoric engages in mimicry, donning 
the mask of oppressive power for selfish ends, and ilinx, "dizziness and 
disorder" producing simultaneously ecstasy and obfuscation (p. 271). 
Whereas modern rhetoric defers to "reason," postmodern rhetoric de-
fers to "will" (p. 275). 
Whether or not intended, the general tenor of his essay implies that 
anyone who identifies with theory labeled as "postmodern" (e.g., the 
work of Baudrillard, Foucault, and Lyotard)5 may, inadvertently, also 
be contributing to the decline of the public sphere. While Goodnight's 
critique is perhaps justified as a critique of private, corporate capital-
ism and advertising rhetoric, in critiquing Lyotard, Goodnight's ap-
proach, in fact, makes it difficult for many with ostensibly similar 
interests to his own to want to walk side by side with him. In his (1995) 
essay in particular, Goodnight shows very little interest or concern in 
work many of us are engaged in, namely academic critiques (socialism, 
marxism, feminism, cultural studies, poststructuralism, postcolonial-
ism, deconstructionism, and anti-racism) of very real oppressions of our 
times. 
Finally, while Goodnight addresses many historical forces leading to 
the evacuation of the political, he does not address those that many 
poststructural scholars have said influence their political projects, 
namely the rise of fascism during World War II and the failed student 
political movements for social justice (e.g., in France), which more or 
less ended in May 1968. At least since the end of World War II, critical 
theorists, including many members of the Frankfurt School, have been 
engaged in a long-term theoretical project to eliminate the potential for 
yet another rise of despotic fascism. We think this telos, in part, 
explains the very often relentless critique of social institutions and 
political ideology, and the tendency to challenge authority, in general, 
for political actions that may tend to consolidate forces against those in 
marginalized social positions. Indeed, Auschwitz is a specter that 
haunts Lyotard throughout The Differend; (1988) the very existence of 
the horrors offascism act for Lyotard as the impetus for finding ways to 
adjudicate claims that do not necessitate the a priori illegitimacy of one 
language game in favor of another. It would be useful for Goodnight to 
address the fact that challenges to authority take place precisely 
because the decisions of those with institutional power very often have 
the widest and most profound long-term effects. 
Furthermore, in his afterward to Power/Knowledge, Colin Gordon 
(1980) discusses the role the failed student movements in France in 
1968 played in changes in theorization in Foucault's work. Those 
following Foucault and others became concerned with the diffusion of 
resistances to various parts of the social sector, with localized resis-
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tances, as well as with universities'-which are continually becoming 
privatized-contributions to the diminishment of political struggles 
and to particular institutionalized practices of discipline replete through-
out society. Arguably, those interested in Foucault's work have cri-
tiqued often invisible and silent political and institutional forces as 
part of an overall engagement with the political. 
Postcolonial research also takes a critical approach to contemporary 
culture; it too, is skeptical ofuniversalisticolonialist conceptions of the 
political. Such research highlights and challenges the role of Western, 
colonial discourse and knowledge in circumscribing the contemporary 
social world in which we live, and often calls attention to the roles 
rhetoric and academic criticism play within neo-colonial contexts (e.g., 
see Shome, 1996; Wander, 1996). 
Our Perspective 
In order to elaborate some of our own work in relation to conceptual-
izing resistance, controversy, and the public, we begin with a brief 
discussion of both Goodnight's and Phillips's handling of the African 
Burial Ground example. What we object to in both essays is that they 
end up valorizing the legitimating features of the state. Both end up 
praising Mayor Dinkins. Both rely on institutional sources-Phillips on 
the New York Times, and Goodnight on government documents (sources 
provided by institutions with authority and ethos deriving from eco-
nomic and political power)-as acceptable speakers for African Ameri-
cans. Both, in our minds, move too quickly to praise social change 
afforded by arguably instrumental institutional means and give short 
shrift to asking whether appeals to Congressional subcommittees and 
the like are acceptable means of resistance that should be encouraged. 
The analysis of the New York Times is particularly surprising and 
contradictory in the case of Phillips's essay, since his criticism of 
research on the public sphere challenges it for focusing too much on 
commensurate discourses. In Phillips's assessment of the "discourse" of 
the African Burial Ground, however, what we get is the discourse 
of/about the African Burial Ground through the lens of New York Times 
reporters. We do not get direct comments from the participants in the 
controversy, nor from the African American vernacular press, for in-
stance; rather, we get an assessment of what happened through an 
acceptable, privileged, dominant institutional lens with its own eco-
nomic interests in covering the issues, and in doing so in its own 
partisan ways. 
In Phillips's response to our essay on outlaw discourse, he suggests 
that, as critics, we should not examine marginalized discourses for fear 
of doing harm to marginal communities. Instead, he suggests that 
"interrogating (in-law) discourses for their incongruities and contradic-
tions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities wanting 
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for an opportunity" is a desirable alternative (p. 100).6 Phillips is 
correct to be wary of unwanted interventions, of submitting marginal-
ized communities to the gaze of the state, of further marginalizing as a 
result of critical analysis, and of questioning the role of criticism as a 
political act. In fact, our own essay also conveys those concerns. Fur-
ther, our 1995 essay on vernacular discourse entails not only examina-
tion of marginalized discourses, but also critical analysis of dominant 
discourses, of the kind Phillips (1999a) promotes in his essay. 
Had Phillips or Goodnight examined discourse of the Black vernacu-
lar press, conducted conversations with leaders in the Black commu-
nity in New York, examined speeches and interviews on Black vernacu-
lar radio programs, contacted people via e-mail, or the like, we argue 
that their analyses would have been stronger, their research would 
have been richer, and their comments on how rhetoric functions would 
have been enhanced. In this way, we suggest logics outside of the 
dominant institutions (e.g., the dominant press) might have been 
brought to the fore. Rather than seeing the halting of construction and 
the erecting of a monument as a mode of resistance, perhaps contradic-
tory positions-antagonistic and dissenting statements-might have 
been made. As Zulick and Laffoon (1991) suggest, "It is the diversity of 
the public sphere" in the form of "enclaved" and "counter-publics" that 
"provides the materials for critique" (p. 252). 
What we were trying to suggest in our (1997) "Out-law" essay is that 
processes of assimilation are oppressive and violate democratic prin-
ciples. Such processes are processes of erasure; they forward one 
culture above another in a hierarchicalized, forced socialization to a 
given hegemony. Thus, given that there is by necessity a multiplicity of 
contexts presently framed in relations of subordination, we ask what 
kind of theory would be necessary to alter the relations of power in such 
a way that cultural, economic, and physical violence, and the discipline 
conducted, would not be applied to some people in order to press them 
into becoming more like others? Such a question necessitates social 
change and the crossing of social boundaries. Indeed, it necessitates 
cultivating an interest in experiences of cultures other than one's own. 
It also necessitates appreciation and respect for logics that, because of 
one's own experiential limitations, may appear quite absurd at the 
outset. Hence, in the 1997 essay we set out, as per Laclau and Mouffe's 
(1985) agenda, to search for a collective identity, a "we," "that would 
articulate the demands found in the different struggles against subordi-
nation" (Mouffe, 1996, p. 247). 
We also set out to eliminate the narcissism associated with the idea 
that a single person or group is able to summon up within herself or 
itself the total realm of subordinated logics-the already existent logics 
that may differentially be operating in local contexts as well as having 
larger effects within the community. And here is where we (1997) dis-
agreed with Mouffe (1993): She regards the religion ofIslam as de facto 
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unassimilable into her conception of politics (p. 59), because in her view 
religion must be a private matter, and since Islam is both public and 
private in practice, in order to be part of the respublica, practitioners of 
Islam also would have to consent to seeing it as private. Her conception 
of politics takes for granted the necessity of a "permanent," "constitu-
tive outside" (1993, p. 69) and requires participants to "accept submis-
sion to the rules prescribed by the respublica in seeking their satisfac-
tions and in performing their actions" (1993, p. 69); it, thus, goes well 
beyond collaboration out of a common interest in the political and a 
common interest in striving for both liberty and equality. 7 
We sought a role for the critic and for criticism to seek outlaw logics, 
whether or not we, ourselves, were operating out of the logics being 
used to regulate and adjudicate within dominant society. We did not 
assume the critic would be able to create, know about, or even find 
logics counter to the dominant logics. Rather, our goal was to insist 
that-in order to address the incommensurability of groups based on 
race, class, gender, class, sexuality, nation, and other subordinating 
structures, processes, and logics-subjects would have to cultivate an 
interest in cultural artistic expressions, ways ofliving, and principles of 
survival contrary to those generally referenced in contemporary popu-
lar discursive forums. 
Of course we were wary that such a project-seeking out outlaw 
discourses and bringing those logics (not necessarily the people) into 
some connection with dominant logics and people-could not be done 
without some risk. The potential for further marginalization is always 
possible; the potential for a backlash, too, is possible. Another potential 
danger is the possibility of objectifying those logics and introducing 
them in a way that was not anticipated, wanted, or desired. Further, we 
recognized, from the outset, our privilege as critics: We recognize both 
the system that allows us movement, leisure time, and access to 
information and resources that necessarily circumscribe the production 
of our theory, and the need to bring logics that challenge and perhaps 
confound dominant logics to the fore. 
In that (1997) essay we also challenged an implied hierarchical 
relationship in Laclau and Mouffe's (1985), as well as in many other 
theorists', work between the "we" of the respublica and the "wes" within 
autonomous organizations, and the logics, geographies, and politics 
that do not simply "add to," "blend into," or acquiesce to those who put 
the "we" public above the more powerful and pressing collectivities. 
Thus, we advocate the construction of a collective identity not unlike 
the one Mouffe describes. However, we recognize that identity changes, 
that there will always be some with the privilege to have more or less 
power to influence that collective, and that collective identity itself does 
not have any necessary a priori status over other forms of identity. 
Like Mouffe, we embrace antagonism as a necessary effect of a social 
system organized on principles of subordination, and as a way of seeing 
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the world that relies on the reality of the enactment of some of 
Goodnight's very principles. Our intention, given our overall political 
philosophy, is to embrace a particular way of thinking about challeng-
ing the social institution: identifying particular logics that are, in fact, 
either in tension or wholly in contrast to the logics within dominant 
sectors of society. Ifit is true, as Mouffe (1996) suggests, that hegemony 
is provisional, that given policies depend on who happens to form them 
and at what time they are formed, then our goal is to invigorate the 
process-indeed, to accelerate the speed-with which encounters be-
tween dominant logics and outlaw logics come into contact, into view, 
and into tension. The basic problem with discussing a generic and 
universal "public sphere" is that all too often the only models made 
available to large populations of people through dominant media chan-
nels are those that already have ethos because of their familiarity. 
Publics that may sometimes function as counter-publics rarely get 
adequate air time to be understood or evaluated, let alone to become 
models for larger social organizing. 
What we hope we have done in this short response to the essays by 
Goodnight and Phillips is to raise a third specter, a third set of 
questions. This is not an attempt by any means to provide closure to the 
arguments and disagreements; instead, we seek to continue to problema-
tize an area of research that becomes ever more complicated and more 
critical as it matures. In the end, what we hope we have added to this 
discussion is the understanding that investigations of rhetorics of 
controversy can also include investigations of the rhetorics ofincommen-
surability. Criticism should not only discuss the ways in which politics 
occurs in controversy and the ways in which various positions can work 
within existing structures; it also can, and should, investigate the 
development of logics and understandings that are incommensurable 
with current systems. There may be times when the rhetoric of the 
outlaw is a rhetoric with a logic that may prove more useful than the 
current rhetorics that institutions allow. 
NOTES 
lGoodnight's work vacillates in its use of the terms "public sphere" and "the public." If 
he were to accept Nancy Fraser's (1989, 1992) terms, and Margaret Zulick and Anne 
Laffoon's (1991) terms, he would use "enclaved" publics or "counterpublics" versus "the 
public sphere" as his primary term. The metaphor of a "sphere," as well as the baggage of 
universalism that follows the term, not to mention the false dichotomy between private 
and public identified largely, but not entirely, by a feminist critique, should render the 
term obsolete. The concept "the political," on the other hand, addresses the need and 
desire for activism, which is not necessarily implied by the term "public sphere," which 
instead very often signals government policy and a system of institutional arbitration, 
hence very often maintenance ofthings as they are. 
2See, for example, Lyotard and Thebaud (1985), Lyotard (1984), and Mouffe (1993, 
1996). 
3See, for example, Habermas (1992). 
4For instance, on the first page Mouffe (1996) writes: "Indeed, I am going to argue that 
it is only in the context of a political theory that takes account of the critique of 
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essentialism-which I see as the crucial contribution of the so-called postroodern ap-
proach-that it is possible to formulate the aims of a radical democratic politics in a way 
that makes room for the contemporary proliferation of political spaces and the multiplic-
ity of democratic demands" (p. 245). 
5See, for example, Baudrillard (1993, 1988, 1987), Foucault (1978), Lyotard (1985). 
6In doing so, Phillips is suggesting that examination of dominant discourses does not 
further marginalize vernacular texts. 
7Within Mouffe's (1996) conception, for instance, one form of participation, which may 
in some instances necessitate not participating, would fall outside of the "rules prescribed 
by the respublica. " 
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